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The governance of the European Union is a central preoccupation of 
policy makers at both EU and national level, and observers both amongst 
citizens (often represented by the media) and academics. The way the EU 
is governed and the way such governance is perceived contributes 
centrally to the legitimacy of the European enterprise and this legitimacy 
underpins both the acceptance and the effects of EU activity. Legitimacy 
is, to varying degrees in different contexts, a product of the way in which 
decisions are taken and the nature of quality of such decisions. In this 
paper I adopt a simple working definition of legitimate decisions as ones 
which are accepted and followed by those to whom they apply, 
irrespective of whether those subject to them agree with them. In some 
contexts the process is everything in achieving legitimacy defined in this 
way, whilst in others no one cares about the process provided the outcome 
is judged to be correct. Most decision contexts are likely to involve a 
legitimacy evaluation which involves a mixture of the two. 
Pressures raised by concerns about both forms of legitimacy affecting EU 
decision making partially explain the turn in legal scholarship away from 
the more traditional preoccupation with the analysis of legislative 
instruments and case law towards a more broadly based conception of 
governance which involves the examination of a more diverse range of 
processes and instruments. This trend has brought lawyers increasingly 
into contact with other disciplines, notably political science, an 
interdisciplinary pact well represented in the five year programme of 
research funded by the European Commission’s Framework Six Research 
Programme under the rubric of ‘New Governance’. 
                                                 
* Colin Scott is the Vice-Principal for Research and Innovation, UCD College of 
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This paper sets the scene for the analysis of EU governance across the 
regulation of markets and social Europe by contrasting a more traditional 
conception of EU law with an analysis of variety in the forms of ‘new 
governance’ instrument. I offer an analytical introduction to some of the 
issues of governance facing the European Union, and to offer an argument 
relating to the choices that have been made in both defining, from a public 
policy perspective, changes in the modes of governance to be adopted, and 
understanding, from an academic perspective, the nature of the choices 
made, the reasons for such choices and the opportunities that may have 
been missed.  
An analysis of the parameters of newness in governance is offered as the 
basis for an evaluation of recent initiatives and discussion. The overall 
argument is that some of the more innovative governance modes are not so 
new, whilst the more recent and celebrated modes, while displaying 
elements of newness are, perhaps, not that innovative. Hence the 
suggestion that we are experiencing only ‘new-ish governance’. The 
question I ask in the paper is whether this limited conception of new 
governance is inevitable given the legitimacy constraints within which the 
EU operates, or is there potential for developing a broader conception of 
governance, which, through broader participation and involvement of non-
governmental governing capacities, might bolster legitimacy through both 
better processes and better outcomes. 
 
II. GOVERNANCE AND THE EU 
The emergence of European Community Law as a field of practice and 
academic study over the last fifty years has been an uneven one. Much of 
the early organising analysis was carried out by public international 
lawyers who were accustomed to thinking about international 
organisations in terms of their legal mandates and legal instruments. The 
view of the European Community law as an aggregate of inter-
governmental organisations could not survive the assault on more 
conventional doctrines as to the effects of international law which were 
initiated by the European Court of Justice in the 1960s and 1970s, and a 
different view of EC law as something which was neither national law nor 




international law but rather a sui generis legal system became the new 
orthodoxy.  
The focus of analysis within this sui generis conception of EC law lay with 
the legal status, capacities and processes of the institutions, together with 
the nature and effects of legal instruments as they were interpreted, in 
particular, by the Court of Justice. The particular emphasis of the 
teleological reasoning of the court has been on a process of European 
integration through law. This way of thinking, rooted in the understanding 
of the potential of, and limits to Community law, enabled the European 
Commission in its White Paper on Governance (2001) to describe the 
classic ‘community method’ of governance. The Community method is 
conceived in terms that exclusive responsibility for making policy and 
legislative proposals lies with the Commission, such proposals are filtered 
through the more democratic institutions of the Parliament and the Council 
of Ministers through processes for adoption, implementation is carried out 
by the Commission and by Member States, and the Court of Justice 
guarantees respect of the rule of law (European Commission 2001: 8). 
This description captures the whole policy cycle for those actions which 
are pursued through the adoption and implementation of regulations and 
directives, though of course fails to hint at the complex processes of 
bargaining and negotiation at each stage.  
We can think of the Community method as involving the setting of legal 
rules by the legislative institutions, at the initiation of the Commission, the 
monitoring by the Commission of member state implementation, with the 
potential administrative and judicial infringement proceedings where 
implementation falls short of requirements – a process driven by legal 
rules and processes. The Community method may be defined in terms of 
core values (notably the pursuit of a common market), core tools (and in 
particular the elaboration of deployment of instruments of Community 
law) and core actors (of which the Community institutions, the Council of 
Ministers, the Parliament and the Commission, are the central actors, but 
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An exclusive focus on the Community method has become untenable 
because so much activity which is clearly relevant to the governance of the 
EU is pursued through other processes and instruments. Lawyers and 
others have similarly questioned an overly narrowly focus on governance 
by law in domestic legal systems. The analysis of political scientists and 
sociologists has been particularly influential in promoting a broader view 
of governance, to which I turn in the next section. Within this kind of 
analysis governance has come to be reconceptualised as involving a wider 
array of mechanisms and actors which steer social and economic 
behaviour. Policy makers and academics have, to some extent, embraced 
this broader conception of governance and, in the EU context, labelled it 
‘the new governance’. 
 
III. NEW GOVERNANCE 
So, the focus by legal scholars on the classic Community method has, in 
recent years, fallen victim to a dissatisfaction that in terms of 
understanding European governance, key parts of the picture are missing, 
and that the development of a broader conceptualisation offers new 
opportunities for better governance (in at least two senses, wider 
participation and more effective instruments) and richer and more 
interdisciplinary understandings of what is happening in particular policy 
domains. Most straightforwardly, practitioners and academics working in 
particular domains readily observed that key aspects of the governance of 
their particular domains diverged, often markedly, from the classic 
community method. Examples can be identified in respect of 
environmental and consumer protection, competition policy, employment 
policy and so on. At a macro-level both policy and academic communities 
abstracted from this domain-specific experiences to reconceptualise not 
only the instruments, but also the relevant actors, and to some extent the 
values to be pursued, as standing in opposition to or at least as a 
development from and shift in emphasis from, the classic ‘Community 
method’. Hence the ‘new governance.’  
 




In the policy world a key part of this process was the articulation of the 
‘Lisbon agenda’ by the Heads of Government meeting in 2000. The core 
objective of Lisbon was defined as making Europe "the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion".  In terms of governance the core innovation identified with 
Lisbon is the aggregation of a variety of mechanisms which deviate 
markedly from the Community method of policy making, under the rubric 
of the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC).  As expressed by the 
Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2000, OMC provided a marked 
contrast with the Community method. The norms or goals of a policy 
domain, rather than being set through legal rules, appear in the form of 
guidelines set at inter-governmental level, but to be implemented in 
national policies and targets (Hodson and Maher 2004). Monitoring 
involves an evaluation against qualitative and quantitative indicators and 
benchmarks. Enforcement deviates markedly from the legal or hierarchical 
model, and is based instead on evaluation, peer review and mutual 
learning. It is the antithesis of harmonisation through law. The European 
Employment Strategy provides a core example of the approach (Kilpatrick 
2006). 
For many, in both policy and academic worlds OMC is the archetypal 
form of the ‘new governance’, notably in the European Commission 
funded programme of research on new governance (Burca and Scott 2006: 
3) The concept of OMC is simultaneously an organising narrative but also 
a ”legitimising discourse” for the governance processes implicated in 
delivering on the Lisbon Agenda, and in particular those instruments 
involving soft law and benchmarking processes at their core (Radaelli 
2003). 
However, the ‘governance turn’ is not exhaustively covered by the Lisbon 
agenda and research on the operation of the Open Method of 
Coordination. Indeed, the concept of governance deployed in the social 
sciences more generally draws our attention to a wider set of issues 
concerning who governs, how they govern and in pursuit of what values or 
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Whilst there is no consensus on what the concept of governance connotes, 
it is frequently deployed to highlight the destabilisation of traditional 
government-centred governance, and the diffusion of governing capacity 
and legitimacy to a wider array of actors. This has important implications 
for instruments, since the legal and coercive instruments which define the 
nature of governmental power are not generally available even to 
governmental actors other than in central government, let alone in the non-
governmental sphere (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004). On the other hand 
there are things that non-governmental actors can do that may not be 
possible, or if possible then may not be legitimate for governmental actors. 
These changes, which partly involve real transformation in underlying 
governing institutions and processes, and partly a reconceptualisation of 
how governance occurs, impact both on both the procedural and 
substantive dimensions of legitimacy, calling into question an exclusive 
focus on governance institutions legitimated by mechanisms of 
democracy, while at the same time highlighting positive dimensions of the 
effectiveness of non-state governance capacity (Black 2001).  
Processes of private and self –regulation provide examples of the sort of 
structures involved. Where bilateral coordination between firms fails, the 
governing norms for technical production and increasingly managerial 
processes are largely set through private standard-setting organisations 
(sometimes with government funding)  at national and supranational level 
(Schepel 2005)). Much social regulation is achieved through association of 
businesses, often motivated by a concern to protect the market reputation 
of their members, but in a manner which can deliver on public interest 
objectives, with or without some governmental monitoring and or steering. 
The European Advertising Standards Alliance has amongst its member 25 
self-regulatory organisations from 25 member states (http://www.easa-
alliance.org/). 
What is striking about private standards processes and advertising self-
regulation in Europe is that neither is particularly new. The leading 
standardisation institutes, DIN, AFNOR and the BSI were established in 
the first quarter of the twentieth century (Hallström 2004). The UK 
Advertising Standards Authority, which provides a model for a number of 
EASA members was established in 1962 in response to the damage to the 
credibility of the advertising industry associated with Vance Packard’s 




pioneering book, The Hidden Persuaders (1957) (Baggott and Harrison 
1986). 
Maybe the newness in ‘new governance’ refers to the use of different 
(though well-established) mechanisms of governance in the new context of 
European governance.  In her work on regulatory innovation, Julia Black 
suggests that innovation might well involve ‘the application of new 
solutions to old problems, or new solutions to new (or newly constructed) 
problems, but not old solutions to old problems’ (Black 2005: 9). 
Furthermore she helpfully distinguishes three levels of change in a 
regulatory regime: change in the settings, for example the level of 
emissions permitted in a pollution control regime; at the second level a 
change in the instruments or institutions of regulation, for example the 
introduction of tradable permits to replace prohibitions on emissions or the 
deployment of enforced self-regulation; and at the third level, change in 
goals or objectives of the regime, a paradigm shift, in which the rationales 
for, and cognitive understanding of the regime is changed, as when 
pollution control shifts from tackling the immediate problems of damage 
to the local environment, to tackle climate change.  
Level one is not innovation, Black suggests, but a change in the settings 
only. From an innovation perspective levels two and three are of more 
interest. Level two has at least two dimensions, changes in institutions and 
changes in instruments. Level three is concerned with the re-programming 
of policy in a domain with new goals and objectives, and even a new way 
of seeing the domain and the purposes of policy with it. 
Applying these insights to the puzzles of EU governance, and addressing 
level three first, the values associated with the Community method focus 
largely on European integration and the completion of the Single Market. 
For both the legislative institutions and the courts integration has been a 
sort of meta-value below which we find other policy objectives such as the 
more obvious free trade and competition, and the less obvious 
employment and consumer policies which were at their origination 
directed, to a greater or lesser extent, also to the Single Market objective 
through promoting employment mobility and confidence in cross-border 
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An important question, therefore, is to what extent ‘new governance’ 
involves a shift away from the traditional preoccupation with the 
completion of the single market. This involves an evaluation of the extent 
to which Treaty changes and policy developments have separated, in 
particular, social policies, from the European integration ideal, and made 
them freestanding. An index for the extent to which such a separation has 
occurred may be gained by an evaluation of the extent to which measures 
in such areas as employment, consumer protection and environmental 
protection extend beyond that which could be justified by reference to the 
integration objective. Such an evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper 
and has generally not received much attention in the new governance 
literature. However, this theme is reflected in the structure of this 
European Law Forum, bringing together as it does expertise both in the 
liberalisation of markets and the development of policy initiatives 
sometimes labelled with the rubric of ‘social europe’. 
Second level change  - change in instruments and institutions – has 
received the most attention in discussion of new governance. Starting with 
instruments, new governance mechanisms frequently deviate from the 
‘rule by law’ model which is closely associated with classic EC 
programmes. What other instruments are available? One way to approach 
the question is by reference to the resources or ‘tools of government’, 
available for implementing policy. A classic analysis of government 
capacities points to formal authority (or as Weber had it, the monopoly of 
legitimate force) as one of a number of relevant tools. Formal authority 
underpins the capacity to act through the use of law, as with the 
Community method, with its emphasis on directing member state 
governments, undertakings and citizens and backing up such directions 
with legal monitoring and enforcement capacity. 
Other tools include Treasure, Nodality and Organisation. A helpful 
acronym to remember the set is NATO (Hood 1984: 4-7). The concept of 
Treasure attempts to capture the capacity of governmental actors to steer 
behaviour through expenditure decisions, for example by offering 
subsidies or writing conditions into purchasing contracts.  The concept of 
nodality alerts us to the position of governments at the centre of elaborate 
networks of exchange of information and perspectives on the policy world, 
which can be harnessed to shape the way that other actors think about 
what is possible and or desirable. The idea of organisation is concerned 




with the capacity of governments to use their substantial staffing and 
organisational resources to achieve government objectives.  
Set within an examination of the tools of government, what is striking 
about ‘new governance’ is the extent to which its mechanisms are based 
on the resource of nodality. Thus OMC exploits the governmental capacity 
of the Council of Ministers linked to nodality to offer an alternative to 
steering member state behaviour through law. Bench-marking and peer 
review invite governments to identify best practice and converge on it, but 
as a voluntary matter. Other mechanisms which deviate from the rule by 
law model of governance are similarly very largely based on the 
exploitation of nodality. For example, the building of networks of 
regulators in the fields of energy, telecommunications, competition and 
financial services, whether with or without legislative underpinning, 
enables the Commission to steer the behaviour of regulators through the 
development of epistemic communities where loyalty, core values and 
methods can be developed amongst the group. Equally the main emphasis 
of the activities of the new European agencies lies in collecting and using 
information in relationships with member state governments and the 
European Commission. A final example involves the development, by the 
Commission, in particular, of soft law instruments’ such as guidance, 
letters of comfort, and circulars, which draw on the authoritative position 
of the Commission (or sometimes the Council) at the centre of nodes of 
EU governance, but without the direct deployment of legal authority 
(where legal authority frequently requires the involvement of other 
legislative institutions who may or may not be willing to comply with 
Commission policies). Soft law instruments are defined as instruments 
which are not legally binding which may have (and indeed are intended to 
have) practical effects (Snyder 1993). 
It is striking that the European institutions make remarkably little use of 
the other tools of government – Organisation and Treasure. This is, of 
course readily explicable. In terms of organisation the European 
institutions are tiny. The most recent statistical bulletin (January 2007) 
reveals that the Commission, which is the largest institution and the main 
focus of institutional capacity, has fewer than 23,000 employees on its 
payroll. Compare this with the (diminishing) number of staff employed in 
the British civil service (over half a million of the 5M-plus public sector 
employees (2006, Q3)) and the (increasing) numbers of civil servants in 
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Ireland (38,400 out of a total public sector employment base of over 
350,000 (June 2006). EU legislative policy does, of course, use the 
organisational capacity of member state governments extensively, but at 
one remove from the EU institutions themselves, and this is regarded as an 
integral part of the Community method, rather than something new. 
Turning to the limited capacity for the use of treasure,  the total EU budget 
for 2006 of 112 B Euro may not appear small, but it is only just over one 
per cent of the GNP of the Union and thus, compared to national 
government budgets, is tiny. Areas of major expenditure in support of 
policy, such as agricultural subsidies (nearly half the entire budget) and 
the structural funds are very much the exception. The budget for the entire 
field of competition policy for 2006 was only 69M Euro. Even in an area 
of policy like humanitarian aid, in which the chief instrument is treasure, 
the budget for 2006 amounted to less than .75B Euro. 
The second aspect of these level two innovations is institutional change. A 
central feature of the wider discussion of governance has been a 
perception that central government actors have been displaced by actors in 
other parts of government and by non-governmental actors – a process of 
fragmentation (Scott 2004). To what extent has institutional change been 
part of the ‘new governance’ reforms in the European Union? One 
response is to say that the EU institutions themselves are a central part of 
the fragmentation of the governing capacity of governments.  There is 
certainly considerable truth in this. The judicial interpretation of the Treaty 
of Rome, in particular, made clear if not the exact extent then certainly the 
issue of the extent to which legal supremacy was ceded from member state 
legislatures to the EC legislature in its areas of competence.  
But this observation about the fragmentation of legal capacity does not 
take away from the claim that the Community method, in our terms, is old 
governance. What institutional changes contribute to the new governance? 
Some commentators advocate the deployment of new European agencies 
as a radical departure from Commission-led governance towards more 
independent and technocratic non-majoritarian institutions (Majone 2001). 
But while there have been a number of waves of new European agencies, 
as noted above, they have generally not conformed to Majone’s ideal of 
the powerful and independent regulator. Rather they are satellite 
organisations to the Commission and, set against the frequent claim that 




they are instruments of decentralisation (Geradin and Petit 2003), their 
effect in many domains, such as environment and food safety, appears to 
be to consolidate the centralised power of the Commission (Scott 2005).  
The ideal-typical instances of OMC involve little institutional innovation 
and little by way of involvement of new actors. The European 
Employment Strategy does, of course, involve dialogue with the ‘social 
partners’, employers and unions, and, prior to this the social partners had 
been given special standing in respect of processes for both making and 
implementing EC employment legislation (EC Treaty Arts 137-9) 
(Kilpatrick 2006). But the emphasis of the OMC processes, more 
generally, is in benchmarking and peer review between the governments 
of member states, coordinated through the Council.  
To find institutional innovations which draw in a wider range of actors we 
need to look elsewhere. Mention has already been made of processes for 
standard setting which are the responsibility of non-state standardisation 
organisations. In the 1980s the Commission and the EC legislature took 
steps to incorporate such standards more directly into European 
governance through the development of the ‘new approach to technical 
standards’ which aimed to set a minimum standard through legislation and 
encourage voluntary take up of more stringent non-legislative standards. 
Whilst for many new governance watchers the ‘new approach’ is 
recognised as an early form of deviation from the Community method 
(Burca and Scott 2006) the extent to which it departs from old governance 
models is understated. The ‘new approach’ is a more or less complete 
delegation of the capacity to make rules to non-governmental bodies, 
except to the extent that the power is retained by the legislature (Schepel 
2005).  
A similar approach can be seen in the area of consumer product safety, 
where the 1992 Directive (92/59/EC, repealed and replaced by 
2001/95/EC) created a hierarchy of standards, such that producers of 
consumer goods could demonstrate compliance with the general safety 
requirement through compliance with non-state standards, in the absence 
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Turning from standard setting to enforcement, another earlier form of 
diffused governance is found in the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts (93/13/EEC) which requires member states to 
empower consumer organisations to enforce compliance with the rules 
prohibiting the use of unfair terms in consumer contracts. This 
enforcement power is capable of being used to negotiate the reformulation 
of contract terms between consumer groups and businesses even in the 
absence of any consumer having suffered loss as the result of the inclusion 
of an unfair term.  
In both the standards and the unfair terms cases the governmental resource 
of authority is deployed effectively to delegate standard-setting (standards) 
or enforcement (unfair terms) capacity.  
Also in the consumer field, we find that the 1984 Directive on the Control 
of Misleading Advertisements (84/450/EEC, amended by Directive 
97/55/EC and to be replaced by the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
2005/29/EC) empowers member states to rely on self-regulatory regimes 
as the first port of call for enforcement of the requirements of the directive 
(which relate to the likelihood of economic loss caused by misleading 
advertisements rather than misleandingness per se), thus giving 
considerable encouragement to the development of self-regulatory 
organisations in this domain, as discussed above. A more general 
permission for member states to place dependence on self-regulatory 
codes is contained in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
(2005/29/EC, art 10). Such self-regulatory regimes are significant for the 
extent to which they move the governance model away from governmental 
legal authority for rule making and enforcement, towards an alternative 
which is based on voluntary membership of self-regulatory associations 
linked to contractual rule making, monitoring and enforcement powers.  
The deployment of the ‘new governance’ might be expected to involve all 
three forms of innovation when compared with the classic model – the 
shift in values and goals, the use of instruments and mechanisms other 
than law and greater involvement of non-governmental actors. In practice 
most of what passes for new governance involves a deviation from classic 
models in only one of these parameters, that is the use of non-legal 
instruments. The key example of the various forms of Open Method of 




Coordination is concerned with coordination of national governments 
using the resource of nodality.  
We find rather little evidence of a shift towards greater involvement of 
non-governmental actors in governing. There is, of course, a recognition 
of non-state actors within policy networks but this is far from new. In any 
case, new governance in this dimension would surely involve not just 
policy discussion but also involvement in the operational tasks of 
governing. The examples discussed above, standardisation, consumer 
enforcement and advertising self-regulation have elements of this 
regulatory diffusion, but these measures pre-date Lisbon and could hardly 
be described as new. Thus, this highly incomplete survey suggests that 
there may not be that much EU governance that is new in both the 
instruments and institutions dimensions, and what there is, in many cases, 
only new-ish. What passes for new, in the sense of post-Lisbon, is perhaps 
less innovative than some earlier initiatives. As to the third level of 
innovation, the re-programming of policy domains with different values, I 
leave it to others here to debate the extent to which the emphasis on ‘social 
Europe’ is subsidiary to more traditional concerns with market integration, 
or alternatively a radical change in direction for the EU. I will proceed 
now to consider some of the implications for legitimacy arising from the 
new and new-ish governance.  
 
IV. LEGITIMACY 
To the extent that changes have occurred in governance, whether in core 
values and goals, instruments and mechanisms, and institutions and actors 
such changes are likely to disrupt the way in which the legitimacy of the 
EU governance is understood. As noted in the introduction, in this paper I 
am working with a simple conception of legitimate decisions as those 
which command support and are followed by those affected by them, 
irrespective of whether those affected agree with them. Domestic 
government decision making derives a substantial part of its legitimacy 
from processes of democratic governance which include regular elections, 
parliamentary scrutiny, rule by law and accountability to the courts. Such a 
legitimacy narrative places considerable emphasis on the processes. 
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An equivalent narrative for the EU has always been somewhat 
problematic. 
There has long been a tension between a legitimating narrative which 
emphasises the inter-governmental and directly elected elements of the EU 
legislature, on the one hand, and the technocratic mission of the European 
Commission on the other. Some see appropriate systems of balances and 
checks between these two dimensions of the EU institutions, whereas for 
others there is a constant risk the technocratic and undemocratic 
dimension will trump the more democratic aspects of the institutional 
balancing act. This debate is a version of the classic legitimacy debate 
which pits the need for efficient and effective governmental decision 
making against the need to demonstrate accountability for decisions to 
democratic processes. As with much domestic debate, the European debate 
is infected too with questions about the capacity for institutions to serve 
their own interests rather than those of the European populace.  
The debate about the balance between democratic and technocratic 
decision making reflects the distinction between input-oriented and out-
put oriented legitimacy (Scharpf 2001). ‘Input-oriented legitimacy’ refers 
to the sense that processes through which decisions are made are 
appropriate, irrespective of the actual outcome.  ‘Output-oriented 
legitimacy’ refers to the acceptance of decisions premised upon their 
substantive quality, rather than the process through which they are made. 
The ‘Community method’ combines both forms of legitimacy, looking to 
the role of the Commission as initiator of policy and legislation to develop 
knowledge and expertise, whilst filtering its proposed actions through 
processes involving both inter-governmental and directly elected 
representation in the Council and the Parliament. Much legislative activity 
involves delegation to the Commission through processes of comitology, 
which shift the emphasis of decision making towards the output-based 
conception of legitimacy. The longstanding concern with the ‘democratic 
deficit’ in the European Union, reflects debates about the sometimes 
fragile legitimacy of the European institutions, and attempts to shift the 
institutional balance which operates between them more towards some 
input-oriented form of legitimacy.  




The empowerment of the Parliament in the co-decision procedure under 
the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent reforms under the Amsterdam 
Treaty were significant steps towards enhancing the democratic input into 
EC legislation, but the legitimacy of EC decision making has remained 
quite fragile. Debates about bolstering input-based legitimacy were 
significant in the deployment of the Convention method used in the 
development of the European Constitution. This more deliberative form of 
democracy was seen as an alternative to inter-government decision making 
on Treaty reform. Unfortunately that method faced and failed an early test 
in the French and Dutch votes on the Constitutional Treaty. The rejection 
of the Constitutional Treaty is a salutary lesson in the difficulty of 
designing governance mechanisms that are perceived to be legitimate. 
What impact might the ‘new governance’ have on the legitimacy of EU 
activities?  We have noted that much of the emphasis of the new 
governance is in a movement away from governance through law towards 
processes involving governmental bodies in processes which develop 
policy and promote compliance with it through the activities of networks 
which deploy the governance resource of nodality. To the extent that the 
legitimacy of the EU might be premised upon the observance of the 
procedural requirements and accountability structures associated with 
Community method, we might expect this new governance shift to 
threaten existing understandings of legitimacy. Put simply it appears to 
threaten the rule of law and associated political and legal accountability 
mechanisms (Burca and Scott 2006: 5-6). In some domains this threat is 
addressed through the involvement of a wider range of affected actors, 
notably in the area of employment policy. But in others, such as economic 
governance, the risk is of policy making moving to a sphere that is 
perceived as less transparent and accountable than the use of more 
traditional methods. 
Such an argument assumes that the legitimacy of the EU is substantially 
premised on the nature of the processes – an inputs-based conception of 
legitimacy. However, an alternative idea is to suggest, that in contrast to 
national governmental arrangements, the legitimacy of the EU institutions 
is much more based on the substance of getting the job done, than on the 
process. Evaluated against this criterion the emphasis in the new 
governance on moving away from legal processes, but the retention of 
governmental actors at the heart of network-based governance processes, 
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faces the risk of insufficient expert involvement from civil society 
organisations. In other words, opportunities for enhancing outcomes 
through wider diffusion of and exploitation of governing capacity may be 
missed.  
The future agenda of the legitimacy of governance might therefore involve 
an evaluation of the extent to which non-governmental actors and 
processes are engaged. In invoking non-governmental activities the 
question is not just about using the capacities that are there, but also about 
developing those capacities in a way that supports future governance 
initiatives. Such capacities are developed not just in isolation, but 
relationally within the learning processes that are involved in participation 
in governance. Many instances of such non-governmental activity may not 
be stimulated by governmental actors, but be merely the subject of 
observation. We should not expect the legitimation of market or 
community actors to be wholly or even mainly dependent upon their 
compliance with the classic mechanisms of accountability which apply to 
governmental actors. Rather we need to evaluate the extent to which 
markets and communities offer alternative legitimation mechanisms which 
might be depended upon. This requires the construction of a more broadly 
based narrative of legitimacy. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I suggest that what passes for new in European governance, 
and in particular the shift from law-based to network-based governance, 
involving governmental actors, is not terribly innovative. Opportunities to 
better engage non-governmental capacities appear to be neglected.  
Equally, where such non-governmental capacity is engaged, sometimes it 
happens in the limited context of an adapted Community method, as where 
the drafting of directives is delegated to the social partners, or the 
enforcement of legal rules is delegated to consumer organisations. Such 
limited vision might be explicable by reference to the constraints imposed 
by the quest for legitimacy. The network-based governance model derives 
some legitimacy from the involvement of EU institutions and domestic 
governments, which might be threatened if more emphasis were placed on 




non-governmental actors. The limited involvement of non-governmental 
actors in legal processes is, arguably, legitimated by the knowledge that 
such actors are constrained by the legal requirements for making and 
enforcing the law.  
And yet, there is good evidence of successful governance processes which 
operate neither within the immediate framework of EC law, nor with the 
direct involvement of governmental actors. The leading examples are in 
the fields of standardisation and self-regulation. These governance regimes 
use the organisational capacity and treasure of non-governmental actors. 
In the case of standards, their legitimacy is derived chiefly from the 
quality of the outputs, and this is tested through the marketing of 
standards. In the case of advertising self-regulation, such market-testing is 
an insufficient source of legitimacy, and there has been a constant quest to 
enhance the involvement of lay people in overseeing the processes so that 
the protected class, consumers, can have confidence in the regime. 
Significantly other regimes of Non-State Market Drive Governance 
(Cashore 2002) have emerged in recent years which testify to the 
possibility of effective and legitimate supra-national non-state governance 
regimes. Leading examples includes the Forest Steward Council and the 
Fair Trade movement, each of which links the pursuit of environmental 
and social objectives through mechanisms of accreditation, monitoring and 
labelling, and enables consumers to choose products compliant with the 
regime in the market-place.  
Is the EU doomed by its fragile legitimacy to maintain a limited 
conception of how governance might be new, or can the insights of 
regimes which involve a greater role for non-state actors and a wider array 
of instruments be harnessed to the objectives of EU governance? If the 
latter is to be achieved, it will require a new narrative of legitimacy which 
can better accommodate governance beyond law, and governance by non-
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